Thomas Lennox, my father, was a member of the “greatest generation” receiving a Purple Heart for injuries he received in action at Iwo Jima during World War II. Growing up, we knew this basic fact, but had very little knowledge beyond that concerning his service or what actually transpired on that fateful day, February 17, 1945. Like many combat veterans, he didn’t talk much about his war experience, at least to his children. It wasn’t until he passed away at the age of 97 in 2019 that we were able to piece together details of his Navy service. In cleaning out his house, we found paperwork he had saved in a nondescript folder that led to the discovery of what happened that day. These are things, as his children, we had always wanted to know and understand. This is his story and that of the LCI(G) (Landing Craft Infantry Gunboats) at the Battle of Iwo Jima.
Since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, seriously depleting the capability of the U.S. Navy, the Japanese appeared invincible. But after a string of defeats the U.S. Navy finally struck a crippling blow to the previously superior Japanese navy at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 which changed the course of the Pacific war. Since then U.S. Marines, Army, and Navy had fought their way across the South Pacific in an island hopping campaign aimed at an eventual invasion of the Japanese homeland. By the later half of 1944, after a series of South Pacific island invasions, the allies were closing the noose.
Thomas Lennox (a native of New Orleans, LA), after a stellar athletic career in high school and college, was accepted for enlistment in the U.S. Navy Reserve Pre-Midshipmens School, Asbury Park, NJ on March 16, 1944 at the age of 21. On May 17 he was sent for additional training to the USNRMS at Northwestern University in Chicago where he was appointed as an Ensign, USNR on September 14, 1944. He was then sent to San Francisco to await his active duty orders. They came on October 11th as he was scheduled to report for duty on the LCI (G) 466 Gunboat located in Guam.
Navy Ensign Thomas Lennox - 1944
Ensign Lennox was transported and reported for duty on October 23rd, 1944 as the 466 started a ten day patrol to support the Third Marine Division in their campaign to wipe out the remaining Japanese on Guam. The Japanese had captured Guam, a U.S. territory in December 1941. The invasion and recapture of Guam by American forces was effectively over by August 1944. But as elsewhere, the Japanese garrison fought practically to the last man. From October 24 to November 23 the LCI(G) 466 performed a number of tasks picking up Japanese prisoners, taking on and transporting U.S. Marine wounded, carrying food and water to Marine patrols, and using radio directional finding equipment to try and locate Japanese sending sets that were still in operation on the island. A secondary assignment was to cruise off the beaches using a public address system and language officer to convince more Japanese to surrender.
LCI(G) 466 Gunboat - 1944-45
On November 23, LCI(G) 466 was detached from their task group in Guam. According to the official 466 commanders log, “We proceeded to Ulithi where we went into availability again in preparation for forthcoming operations. On 3 February, 1945 we got underway and commended exercises and rehearsal with an Underwater Demolition Team. On 9 February, we proceeded to Taipan-Tinian area to execute Dog Day portions of future operations. On 13 February, we formed up with other ships of the Task Force. Our destination was IWO JIMA.”
In February, 1945 the Japanese were losing the war. Allied forces were closing in on the Japanese home islands. The U.S. Army Air Force began high-altitude daylight bombing raids. From June 1944 until January 1945, U.S. Army Air Force B-29 Superfortress bombers stationed in India and staged through bases in China made a series of nine high-altitude bombing raids on targets in western Japan. Expanded in November 1944 from bases in the Mariana Islands, these raids on industrial targets were largely ineffective. In February 1945 the Army Air Force switched tactics to low-altitude night firebombing against urban areas as a large amount of manufacturing took place in small workshops and private homes. This campaign resulted in large-scale urban damage and civilian casualties.
The Allies were gradually putting more pressure on the Japanese to force a surrender. But the Japanese were fanatically determined to fight to the last man. Iwo Jima was considered strategically important to the Japanese as it provided an air base for Japanese fighter planes to intercept long-range B-29 Superfortress bombers. It was also being used to stage nuisance air attacks on the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian, Guam) from November 1944 to January 1945. Iwo Jima was important to the Americans, not only to remove this threat, but an airstrip on the island would allow the B-29s to refuel and make emergency landings when attacking the Japanese mainland.
Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander at Iwo Jima, had engineered their defenses in-depth so that every part of Iwo Jima was covered by defensive fire. So successful was the Japanese preparation for the battle that months of pre-invasion bombing by the American Navy and Army Air Force had little effect on the Japanese defensive positions. Hundreds of hidden artillery and mortar positions along with land mines were placed. Eighteen km of tunnels allowed for troop movement to go undetected. A handful of kamikaze pilots were also available for use against the Allied fleet.
It was into this formidable Japanese defense that the LCI(G)s and UDT (Underwater Demolition Teams) sailed two days prior to the Marine invasion. The mission of the UDT Navy swimmers (precursor to the Navy Seals) was to check beach and surf conditions, search for obstacles on the beach and in the water approaches, and if possible take soil samples in small tobacco sacks from the beach for examination back on board ship. Obstacles were to be destroyed when found. The job of the LCI(G) gunboats was to cover the UDT swimmers with their firepower eliminating any Japanese threats.
February 17, 1945 turned out to be a clear, beautiful day. Bombardment activities on D-minus-2 (two days before the actual planned invasion) accomplished considerably more than on the previous day. The day began with battleships and cruisers bombarding Iwo Jima and minesweepers clearing nearby waters. The battleship USS Tennessee was tasked with shelling the southeastern corner of the island as well as Mount Suribachi, where the Japanese had installed a battery of four large-caliber guns that the Tennessee was to neutralize. The battleships Tennessee, Idaho, and Nevada poured fire on their sectors at a range of 10,000 yards before closing to 3000 yards for about two hours before breaking off at 1025. At 1020, seven destroyers advanced to 3,000 yards from the island, passing the battleships as they pulled back, and opened fire with their 5-inch guns. This day also gave airmen perfect flying weather and they showered destruction on the island from sunrise to sunset. Carrier pilots flew 226 sorties that day, concentrating on dual-purpose guns and automatic antiaircraft weapons around the airfields, as well as both beach areas in support of UDT operations.
USS Tennessee Gunfire responsibility on Sector 2
The LCI(G) - Landing Craft Infantry Gunboat - was powered by 4 General Motors Diesel engines and measured 158’ 5 1/2” in length and 23’ 3” beam to beam with a top speed of 16 knots. It carried a complement of 5 officers and 65 enlisted men. The LCI(G) had the most fire-power of the various LCI class boats. Armaments included two 40mm guns, four 20mm guns, six .50cal machine guns, and ten MK7 rocket launchers.
Twelve LCI(G) gunboats (346, 348, 438, 441,449, 450, 457 (Group Flag), 466, 469, 471, 473, and the 474) were in position to support the UDT swimmers. Seven were sent in past the destroyers and five were held in reserve. The 466 commander’s log states, “We arrived at a point eight miles southeast of Iwo Jima and proceeded on various courses and speeds prior to commencing underwater demolition support. The LCI(G) 466 at 0800 was ordered to fall out of formation and take charge of the reserve group of LCI(G)’s. The reserve group, LCI(G)’s 466, 469, 471, 348, and 346, formed a column and maneuvered on various courses at four knots, remaining five miles off the southeast coast. The LCI(G) 466, in position 500 yards astern of the destroyer USS Capps, was standing by to replace the LCI(G) 473, the 450, or the 474 on the extreme left flank, should any of them be forced to retire.”
The seven LCI(G)’s involved in the initial UDT support advanced in a line abreast through the line of destroyers, each gunboat facing its assigned beach closing to positions 1,000 yards off shore. A couple of thousand yards behind the LCI’s, seven LCP(R)’s (Landing Craft, Personnel Ramped) were idling. Each carried a UDT platoon: 10 or 12 swimmers, a boat officer and crew, machine gunners, a fire-support officer to be ferried to the gunboat responsible for the platoons beach, as well as Marine observers. While the UDT’s awaited orders to head for the beach, the LCI(G)’s that had advanced, began to experience stiff opposition with extremely heavy mortar and large-caliber weapons fire from enemy shore batteries. Gunboat crews immediately answered these Japanese batteries with their own rocket barrages and 40mm gunfire.
LCI(G)s 438, 474, and 450 move toward the beaches at Iwo Jima to cover UDT operations on 17 February 1945. During the coverage, all three ships were hit by Japanese shore batteries. LCI(G) 474 was sunk and 438 and 450 sustained damage and casualties.
Nick Grosso, a crew member aboard the LCI(G) 450 recalled, “We begin our attack - seven LCIs lined up abreast moving toward the beach. We watch the Corsair planes diving and their bombs being released while over us. The Battlewagons, Cruisers, and the Destroyers are all firing at the island. All we could do is watch and listen. Slowly we move in closer; the orders come to load and standby. We inch closer - I can see Mt. Suribachi. The big ships stop firing and the planes leave; now we are on our own. The order comes ‘Commence firing!’ We begin firing. There is no time for thinking, only the job we are supposed to do. Now the order is given, ‘Cease firing; standby for rocket firing!’ The rockets head inland as they are fired and we crouch down to avoid the rocket blast. Our ship is getting hit again and again and the bow is on fire. We’re still firing and the ship is still getting hit. The men on the bow gun can’t fire anymore; the deck is starting to sag from the heat of the fire and the Jap shells are still hitting us.”
Iwo Jima’s commander, General Kuribayashi, had made a critical error. He mistook the reconnaissance and advance of the LCI(G) gunboats with their rocket fire to be the beginning of the real invasion. He ordered his gunners to let loose with some of his heaviest weapons which had been heavily camouflaged. U.S. spotters were able to pinpoint these Japanese gun locations, and soon U.S. destroyers, cruisers, and battleships joined the eruption of gunfire.
Destroyed 120 mm Japanese Gun - East Beach Sector 2 on Iwo Jima
At 1100, in the midst of this heavy gunfire, the LCP(R)’s sped past the covering LCI(G)’s. UDT-12’s two platoons were responsible for Red Beach 1 and 2. Each team rolled into the water off their LCP(R) 500 yards from shore by 1110. Each two-man team was assigned a 100-yard section of the beach. UDT Ensign Joe Artman, a member of UDT-12, recalled, “We went past seven gunboats giving us fire support. The Japanese thought it was the real invasion. Scared? Oh hell yes!” The water was calm with no swells to hide behind, so the UDT swimmers spent as much time underwater as possible. ”We could see firing all around,” Joe remembered. “If we went underwater, we could catch bullets in our hands that had gone into the water and were falling. For the Japanese it was like trying to shoot apples in a tub.”
UDT Swimmers on LCP(R)
After nearing the shore, the frogmen swam 100 yards along it. All the while they took soundings; searched for mines, gun emplacements, and landmarks; and judged the height of the beach's high sand terraces. They carefully wrote their findings down on their Plexiglas tablets. Some of the men even ventured onto the beach to gather sand.
UDT and LCI(G) Iwo Jima Beach Coverage Assignments on D-2
The initial line of outgunned LCI(G)’s were taking a brutal pounding. LCI(G) 450 facing Red Beach 1 withdrew on fire as she was quickly hit by numerous large-caliber shells which opened huge holes in her thin quarter-inch-thick hull. Opposite Red 2, LCI(G) 474 sustained even more damage and rolled over on her starboard side.
From the LCI(G) 466 commanders log, “At 1105, the 466 was ordered to replace the 473 which had received several severe hits. We passed between destroyers CAPPS and LEUTZ, and, as we passed the destroyer line, we observed the 474 and 450 retiring to seaward, having suffered hits sufficient to put them in a sinking position. The 466 was, then alone in that sector. Our course was changed and the attempt was made to support swimmers on three beaches on the left flank. At 1112, the order was given to commence fire, but in accordance with previous instructions, only the 40mm guns were used. The 20mm guns were fully manned, however. At 1123, at a distance of 1200 yards from the beach, we were hit by three six-to-eight inch enemy shells. Numbers four and five guns received hits almost simultaneously, resulting in explosions and fire in the gun tubs. The guns were rendered inoperative. The third hit demolished the pilot house, severing all communications between the conn and the rest of the ship. Hot shrapnel caused fires in number three crew’s compartment, pierced the deck and bulkhead plating at the forward end of the mess hall, pierced the deck over compartment 316, which contained 4000 gallons of water, and caused fires in the troop officers’ cabin which all suffered many shrapnel holes. We were now completely out of control and were ordered by (Group Eight) Commander Malanaphy to retire.”
LCI(G) 466 Under Japanese Gunfire at Iwo Jima
Ensign Frank Jirka, Jr. was a member of UDT 12 assigned to cover the Red beaches along with selected members of First Lieutenant Russell Corey’s B Company, FMF Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion. He later recalled: “Well, word was given to embark, so we climbed down into the boats. Our landing crafts formed in a column corresponding to our beaches and directly behind the column of LCI’s. When we reached our prearranged distance off the shore the LCI’s turned, went parallel to the island and upon reaching their assigned beach turned in. Our landing crafts did likewise. Just as we were about 400 yards off our beaches, all hell broke loose. Mortars, coast guns, machine guns and small arms fire was being fired all around us and at us from what looked like a rather dead island ten minutes before. We tried to call for some fire support, but it was of no avail, since we couldn’t tell exactly where the firing was coming from due to the Japs’ crisscrossed pattern of defenses, with interlocking trenches, gun positions and rat hole-like caves.”
They had completed their mission and looked for their supporting LCI(G) to see if they could assist in identifying enemy targets. They searched for their ship but it was not there. LCI(G) 466 had replaced it and was covering operations on the Green beaches. Along with a Marine captain and two other Marines, Jirka boarded the LCI(G) 466 and recalled, “While the morning operation was still underway and after some of us finished our reconnaissance, a marine captain, two of his men, and I went out to where our supporting LCI was to be located. We found that it was hit and out of action. Just then a large shell hit near our craft and raised the aft end up with quite a force. After looking around we noticed an LCI that wasn’t the one assigned to us (LCI(G) 466), but which was off our beach. We decided to go aboard and try to spot our gunfire from it. We came alongside and the four of us climbed aboard. I went up to the bridge, told them what I was there for and what team I represented. I was standing at the time, on the after port side of the bridge, but since the forward gun’s smoke was obstructing my view, I moved to the forward starboard side. I no sooner moved over when our ship, which was around l700 yards off the beach and slowly moving in, almost got hit.”
“ I said to the captain that it looks like we’re getting in pretty close, when the next thing I knew I was flat on the deck, wounded. I tried to stand but was unable to do so. Since I was not suffering from any pain I looked down to see just why I was unable to stand. It was then that I noticed a pair of blown up feet at right angles to my body, without shoes or stockings. I thought surely those couldn’t be mine for I was wearing shoes when I came aboard. Then I suddenly felt a painful drawing sensation and upon noticing carefully found that those mangled pieces of skin and bone were all that was left of my good nine and a half C’s. I then crawled to the after end of the bridge, for the spot that I was standing on was no longer there. I asked for some morphine and gave myself a shot.”
Ensign Thomas Lennox was one of six officers aboard the LCI(G) 466 on that fateful day. Two months later, in an April, 1945 newspaper interview, the 22-year old Lennox, who was still under treatment at the Naval Hospital for multiple severe fragment wounds to the arms and legs recalled, “Enemy spotters were directing their mortar fire from within two wrecked boats at the water’s edge. Our ship helped pick them off, and then fired at an airplane wreckage dump which we got a mysterious phosphorous reaction that we couldn’t figure out.” He continued, “You see, two mortar shells knocked out all our steerage and signals in the pilot house and we had to get up steam and clear out. So we lined up, from the rear steering wheel to the engine room, each of us shouting directions for the engineer.”
“I was sitting on the last rung of the ladder, relaying orders to the next human link a few feet below me. My arm was bleeding pretty badly. The exec told me to go below and get it treated, but I went and sat in an old gun bucket. Inside was a kid who’d gotten shrapnel stuck against his head. With my left hand I could scrape it off for him, because it hadn’t gone very deep. The two of us laid in that gun bucket for a little while, and when I looked up over the rim, I saw an American destroyer charging down - within ten yards of colliding with our LCI. Of course, I was plenty scared, but their skipper backed her down and a crash-up wasn’t added to our worries.”
A fellow officer on the LCI(G) 466, Dean Weber, in a letter to Lennox in 1983 wrote, “Well Tom, it’s been a long time since that fateful 17 February morning. I relive it every 17th of February. I am glad you came out of it like you did. I know it wasn’t easy. I was so lucky. The deck blew up around my feet, but I was unscratched. Everything was out and we were dead in the water, but we got orders passed to the engine room by a sort of word of mouth relay. I think the Tennessee maneuvered alongside us instead of us doing the maneuvering.”
The LCI(G) 466 commanders log states, “With a chain of human voice communication from conning tower to hand steering and engine room, and with much difficulty, we maneuvered along side the USS Tennessee to transfer our severe casualties. All personnel aboard the 466 had performed capably and bravely. There were twenty-five casualties, four died and were buried at sea at 1545 that day. Our pre-invasion mission was completed.”
Many ships served as temporary hospitals for the wounded. A novelist, John Marquand, who was gathering material aboard the USS Tennessee, described coming alongside the LCI(G) 466, “There was blood on their main deck, making widening pools as she rolled in the sluggish sea. A dead man on a gun platform was covered with a blanket. The decks were littered with wounded.”
Ensign Lennox, in the Naval hospital two months later, remembered the actions aftermath. “A little while later we sent a flash signal to a battleship (USS Tennessee) and asked them if we could come alongside. We came up on the fantail, and the wounded men were lowered aboard in wire baskets. We stayed aboard the battleship and got swell first aid for nine days, and then I was transferred to another ship that took me to Guam for an operation.”
All 12 of the LCI(G) gunboats were damaged. In a 45-minute period beginning at 1100, nine were put out of action by Japanese shelling. The LCI’s took a terrible beating, but this sacrifice caused the Japanese to reveal the location of their heaviest guns. To furnish concealment for the UDT’s and decimated LCI(G)’s, the battleships Tennessee, Nevada, and Idaho quickly put down a smoke screen along the entire eastern beach area. Under this smoke screen and additional covering fire from the battleships, the UDT’s withdrew from the beach.
By 1220 all UDT swimmers had been recovered and back aboard their APD’s (transport destroyers) making their reports. Results of the reconnaissance were reassuring. The UDT swimmers reported beach and surf conditions suitable for a beach landing. No underwater or beach obstacles existed and the single mine found was destroyed. Miraculously, they had suffered only one casualty.
For the LCI(G)’s the outcome was far different. More than 200 Navy sailors and Marines were killed or wounded on the 17th, the great majority being men on the LCI(G)’s. Of the twelve LCI(G)s that had covered the UDT on February 17th. all had been hit and damaged. With LCI(G) 474 sunk and 441 and 473 under tow, the surviving LCI(G)s limped back to Saipan. My father’s ship, the LCI(G) 466, took three direct hits on the gun deck and pilothouse, disabling both 40mm guns, demolishing the interior of the pilothouse and causing heavy casualties. The boat would require major hull repair.
LCI(G) Battle Damage on 17 February 1945
For their action on 17 February 1945, LCI(G), Group 8, Flotilla 3 were presented the Presidential Unit Citation with a star. The CO of the 449, LTJG Rufus Herring, was awarded the Medal of Honor. Many Silver and Bronze Stars were awarded to the officers and crews of these ships, as well as Purple Hearts to all wounded.
The action of the LCI(G) gunboats was inspirational to everyone who watched. Captain B. Hall Hanlon, Commander Underwater Demolition Teams, Amphibious forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet reported: “It is the opinion of this command that LCI(G) Flotilla THREE made Naval history and added a fine page to our Naval tradition during its support of the Underwater Demolition Teams on the morning of DOG minus TWO [17 February 1945] at IWO JIMA. This is not based alone on their original going in to the 1000 yard line on a very hazardous mission, but on the fact that these ships remained at their stations until either all guns were knocked out, fires were out of control, or the ship was sinking. Under those circumstances, and only under those, did they retire from the line, and then making such temporary repairs as were essential, they returned to the firing line.”
The Presidential Citation reads: “For extraordinary heroism during action in support of beach reconnaissance by Underwater Demolition Teams at enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, on February 17, 1945. Opening heavy strafing fire as they moved in from two thousand yards off shore, the lightly armored ships of LCI(G) Group EIGHT advanced steadily under sporadic fire of the enemy until they reached the one thousand yard line to blast the heavy coastal defenses with barrage rockets. Almost immediately the shattering counterfire from well concealed and strongly fortified Japanese positions began to exact a terrific toll. One by one their guns were silenced; fires started and spread in ready ammunition; under the sustained deadly blast of hostile fire, their engine rooms flooded and those of the gallant ships still operable towed their powerless companion ships clear of the overpowering fire of the enemy. Suffering desperate casualties, the units of this valiant group evacuated the wounded, extinguished their fires and resolutely returned to the firing line. Only when the beach reconnaissance had been accomplished did LCI(G) Group EIGHT retire after absorbing an hour and a quarter of devastating punishment in support of the stout-hearted swimmers of the Demolition Team. Manned by fighting and skilled seamen, these gunboats daringly pitted their fire-power against the overwhelming might of Japanese guns zeroed on them from the shores of Iwo Jima and bravely led the way for the invasion two days later.”
The debacle of 17 February 1945 led to a number of recommendations for the use of the LCI(G) gunboats. In his report on the operations of Task Force 52 (Amphibious Support Force) at Iwo Jima, Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy (Commander Amphibious Group One) recommended “[t]hat LCI(G)’s be not employed in close support of UDT operations in heavily fortified areas until considerable reduction of the defenses has taken place.” Recommendations by Lieutenant Commander Willard V. Nash (Commander LCI(G) Group EIGHT—CTU 52.5.2) included the use of rockets with a longer range so that the gunboats could launch them while still out of range of shore batteries. Japanese buoys had been spotted in the water but were not taken into consideration. Later it was surmised that they were probably ranging markers that allowed the Japanese to effectively zero in on the gunboats. The buoys were destroyed by LCI(G) and LCS(L) gunboats in the following two days. In addition, Commander Malanaphy of LCI(G) Group 8, Flotilla 3 wrote, “It is considered that the designs painted by some ships on the forward side of the conning station is an undesirable practice as it furnishes a point of aim at the most vital station in the ship.” As a result the practice was halted.
In the final two major battles of the Pacific War, there were horrific casualty rates at both Iwo Jima and Okinawa. When the Marines landed on the Iwo Jima beaches, Allied planners expected a brief campaign. But Japanese forces mounted a fierce defense for more than five weeks. At Iwo Jima, U.S. forces suffered 6,821 killed and 19,217 wounded. Of the 20,000 Japanese garrison, only a few hundred remained alive to be taken prisoner. Okinawa was even worse. The land, sea, and air battle continued for nearly three months. Almost 2,000 kamikaze suicide attacks would sink 26 Allied ships and damage another 164. Victory at Okinawa would cost more than 49,000 American casualties, including 12,000 deaths. About 90,000 Japanese combatants and an estimated 150,000 Okinawan civilians were killed. These bloodbaths horrified Allied commanders. Firebombing and an imminent invasion of the Japanese mainland was not shaking the resolve of the Japanese to fight to the final person. To avoid an exponentially larger death-toll by invading the Japanese mainland, President Truman ordered atomic bombs detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945.
As a family, we finally know the story of my father’s wartime combat experience. It was a hour in time that haunted his memory and dreams from time to time. We saw that Purple Heart in a frame hanging on the wall, his deformed right arm and hand, pieces of shrapnel that would come to the surface of his skin years after the war that would have to be removed - but he kept the details of that day largely hidden from us. Unknown to us, over the years, he conversed with shipmates and was a member of the USS Landing Craft Infantry Association. He was a man of many interests, but this was one of the defining moments of his life. In his later years, he did tell me that there were not many nights when he went to bed without thinking of 17 February 1945. I guess the old adage is true, the only people who can understand what it’s like to be in combat are those who have been in combat themselves. As a veteran myself (though not in combat) and one of his children, I’m thankful he didn’t let his war experience break him. He lived a long and productive life.
As a family we have closure. Your memory stays alive with us, Dad. Thanks for much more than your service.